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The Irony of Vietnam : The System Worked

Leslie H. Gelb

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The Irony of Vietnam : The System Worked

by Leslie H. Gelb
The Irony of Vietnam : The System Worked - Thryft
The Irony of Vietnam : The System Worked - Thryft
Note: While we do our best to ensure the accuracy of cover images, ISBNs may at times be reused for different editions of the same title which may hence appear as a different cover.

The Irony of Vietnam : The System Worked

by Leslie H. Gelb
Condition guide

Book Condition Guide

Books in Like New Condition

This book may contain very minor cosmetic defects, but it is in pristine condition. There should be no yellowing, no foxing, no water damage, and no annotations of any kind on the cover and the pages. For paperbacks, there should not be any crease marks on the spine. This book is good as new — lucky you!

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Books in Very Good Condition

This book has been used, but it is still in a clean condition. There should be no foxing or annotations of any kind on the inner pages, but a sparse amount may be present on the cover, title pages, or outside edges of the book. There should be no water damage of any kind. For paperbacks, there may be light crease marks on the spine.

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We do our best to ensure the quality of our books, but there is no escaping the wear and tear that comes with time. Slight foxing and some annotations may be present on the pages and the cover. There should be no water damage of any kind. For paperbacks, there may be several crease marks on the spine.

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Books in Well Read Condition

This is a well-read book, which means that the previous owner probably really enjoyed it! The cover and pages may include moderate foxing and annotations, but the text is not obscured and still readable. Moderate cosmetic defects and minor water damage may be present on the edges of the book. For paperbacks, there may be multiple crease marks on the spine.

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ISBN: 9780815730712
Author: Leslie H. Gelb
Publisher: Brookings Institution Press
Date of Publication: 1979-03-01
Format: Paperback
Related Collections: History, Politics
Related Topics: American History, Politics, War, Political Science, History, Government
Goodreads rating: 3.89
(rated by 44 readers)

Description

"Few analysts of U.S. involvement in Vietnam would agree with the provocative conclusion of this book. The thesis of most postmortems is that the United States lost the war because of the failure of its foreign policy decisionmaking system. According to Gelb and Betts, however, the foreign policy failed, but the decisionmaking system worked. They attribute this paradox to the efficiency of the system in sustaining an increasingly heavy commitment based on the shared conviction of six administrations that the United States must prevent the loss of Vietnam to communism. However questionable the conviction, and thus the commitment, may have been, the authors stress that the latter ""was made and kept for twenty-five years. That is what the system—the shared values, the political and bureaucratic pressures—was designed to do, and it did it."" The comprehensive analysis that supports this contention reflects the widest use thus fare of available sources, including recently declassified portions of negotiations documents and files in presidential libraries. The frequently quoted statement of the principals themselves contradict the commonly held view that U.S. leaders were unaware of the consequences of their decisions and deluded by false expectations of easy victory. With few exceptions, the record reveals that these leaders were both realistic and pessimistic about the chances for success in Vietnam. Whey they persisted nonetheless is explained in this thorough account of their decisionmaking from 1946 to 1968, and how their mistakes might be avoided by policymakers in the future is considered in the final chapter."
 
Note: While we do our best to ensure the accuracy of cover images, ISBNs may at times be reused for different editions of the same title which may hence appear as a different cover.

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